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Abstract
Although explicitly installed as a transitory body, the Dutch telecommu-
nication controller OPTA displays the typical signs of government institu-
tions that seek to become indispensable. A conﬂict in OPTA’s two main
policy objectives—guarding consumer prices through controlling the net-
work operator and encouraging entry into the telecommunication market—
hinders OPTA in making itself redundant. It is shown that a market
structure with a dominant owner of the network and a few fringe ﬁrms,
among which OPTA referees for ever, is a stable Nash equilibrium. Some
possible remedies for this undesirable state of aﬀairs are discussed. Long
live OPTA, but leaner and meaner, supervising a symmetrically competing
market.
Keywords : natural monopoly, network regulator, Niskanen eﬀect.
JEL-codes : H11, L51.
1 Introduction
In order to check and balance the gradual process of liberalization in the Dutch
telecommunication market, in August 1997 the government of the Netherlands
installed the Onafhankelijke Post en Telecom Autoriteit (OPTA). As the lib-
eralization was expected to over time invite suﬃciently many new competitors
into the telecom market to challenge the dominant former state monopolist
KPN Telecom, it has always been the intention to do without OPTA again,
once a reasonably equal and stable division of the market among several com-
petitors would establish—in fact, only upon a long debate in parliament it was
decided to install OPTA at all, as controlling the telecommunication market
was thought by many to resort under the regular tasks of the Nederlandse
Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa). In the 1996 notice to the Dutch parliament,
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tricht, The Netherlands. Bjørn Volkerink is corresponding author, preferably via e-mail at:
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accompanying the proposal to change the Telecommunicatiewet of 1988 to ac-
commodate for installing OPTA, for example, it reads that:
“The postal and telecommunications sectors currently are in a tran-
sition phase from monopoly to perfect competition (‘volledige me-
dedinging ’). In light of the aim to establish perfect competition in
both sectors as soon as possible, it has been decided to temporarily,
and in addition to the existing general competition regulations, ap-
ply speciﬁc legal conditions that in certain cases inspect competitive
relationships (among other things with an eye to ‘competition engi-
neering’). (. . . ) This speciﬁc regime will be terminated the moment
one can speak of a functioning of the market that is such that it
suﬃces to further do with the normal competition regime [NMa]. It
is diﬃcult to provide an indication as to when this will be possible.
For that reason, an evaluation mechanism has been built into the
law proposal.” (Memorie van Toelichting bij de Wet Onafhankeli-
jke Post- en Telecommunicatie Autoriteit, pp. 9–10, our translation
from the Dutch original.)1
In the process towards this envisioned competitive telecom market, OPTA’s
main tasks would be the execution of those sections of the modiﬁed Telecom-
municatiewet that concern market supervision. Besides mitigating in conﬂicts
between individual suppliers, this task chieﬂy consists of controlling the tariﬀs
that KPN Telecom charges others for the use of the ﬁxed telecommunications
network, the ownership of which it inherited from the Dutch government.
Since KPN Telecom is in a position of natural monopoly, this supervision of
its tariﬀs is desirable. It would, after all, be both unreasonable and ineﬃcient to
allow the company to proﬁt from an infrastructure and a dominant position in
the market it has essentially obtained for free. It was therefore put in law that
OPTA regularly checks tariﬀ-proposals against KPN Telecom’s cost structure,
and is required to accord them before they can be installed. More explicitly,
the prices KPN Telecom’s charges to other telecommunication ﬁrms should be
suﬃciently close to KPN Telecom’s average costs. With this referee provision,
KPN Telecom is kept from the temptation to exploit its exceptional position
as owner of the ﬁxed network, either to restrict entry into the telecom services
market, or to make excessive economic proﬁts on the services it supplies itself.
1The provision was indeed part of the subsequent evaluation of OPTA. Cf. Kabinetsstand-
punt evaluatie OPTA–6th July 2001.
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Interestingly enough, the Telecommunicatiewet also speciﬁes that OPTA is
to be ﬁnanced independently from government. To that end, OPTA is enti-
tled to a fee from the telecom ﬁrms it supervises. That is, any supplier of
telecommunication services that intends to use the KPN Telecom network, is
required to pay a yearly contribution to OPTA, which consists of a ﬁxed part
and a part that varies in the number of connections the supplier services. Since
the intention is that OPTA focuses its control on the dominant ﬁrm(s), rather
than the fringe, it uses two tariﬀ structures. Firms with a market share below
25% pay both a low ﬁxed and a low variable tariﬀ, whereas companies with
so-called “considerable market power” (aanmerkelijke marktmacht), measured
as a market share of more than 25%, pay a considerably higher amount.2
OPTA’s tariﬀs are in turn subject to a yearly revision by the Minister
van Verkeer en Waterstaat, based on the costs OPTA reports to have been
necessary for carrying out its task in the previous year.3 These do not include
costs made for bilateral mitigation, as the actual costs thereof are levied directly
on the parties involved. The diﬀerentiation in OPTA’s tariﬀs between parties
with and without considerable market power are acknowledged by the Besluit
vergoedingen Telecommunicatiewet and equal 80% and 20% respectively.4,5
As said, the objective was and is to substantially trim OPTA’s operational
powers, once it has accomplished its tasks of guidance to the liberalization
process to the point that balanced competition in telecommunication services
has been established. That is, upon a process of entry and exit in the market,
OPTA’s duties would be reduced to just that of controlling the network fee and
mitigating in isolated cases, a much more modest task than its present functions.
It has, however, been observed that OPTA’s intentions have gradually changed.
Instead of allowing to gradually be dissolved, it seems OPTA actively seeks for
enlargement of its interventionalist’s role.6
In itself, this kind of behaviour is not uncommon for a bureaucratic body—
albeit it unbecoming. The seminal analysis of Niskanen (1971) on bureaucratic
empire building presses the point that bureaucracies have the objective to maxi-
mize their budget—measured, for example, in terms of employees, or total costs,
2For more details on the ﬁnance structure chosen for OPTA see Besluit vergoedingen
Telecommunicatiewet (1999) and for the actual ﬁgures, see, for example, Regeling vergoedingen
OPTA 1999 and 2002.
3As of 2002, the dutch Ministry of Economic Aﬀairs is responsible for this.
4Op cit. art. 4, sect. 3.
5Cf. Regeling vergoedingen OPTA 2003, p. 18.
6Cf. Van Damme (2002).
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or just slack—and will do so particularly when they are in a principal-agent set-
ting and their position resembles one of a monopoly. Given the nature of OPTA,
these conditions seem to apply. Information asymmetries are likely to exist be-
tween the agency and the ministry, which provides the budget and OPTA is the
sole controller of the telecom market. Although the quantitative impact of this
should not be overstated, qualitatively the Niskanen eﬀect has survived more
recent scrutiny and today is widely acknowledged.7
Without the intent to make such an extreme acquisition, we here forward
the argument that a serious conﬂict in OPTA’s objectives, installed in the
Telecommunicatiewet—albeit not hindered by OPTA’s natural drive to survive
as an institution—is likely to prevent it from ever becoming redundant. This
central conﬂict is between OPTA’s objective to keep the tariﬀs KPN Telecom
charges to the independent suppliers close to the average costs of their use of the
network, and its stated goal to invite entry and balance competition. These two
ends bite, and as a result cannot be expected to both be met in the long-run.
The telecommunication market will remain in unbalanced competition, with
KPN Telecom as the dominant ﬁrm, a small competitive fringe, and OPTA the
unavoidable mitigator.
This rest of paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a sim-
ple model of the underlying fundamentals of the telecommunication market. It
is shown that a stable Nash equilibrium exists, with features quite similar to
the situation present in the Dutch ﬁxed network telecommunication market.
Moreover, OPTA’s role in establishing equilibrium is crucial as it controls both
the revenues of KPN Telecom and the costs of the fringe, via the interconnec-
tion tariﬀ. An example illustrates these short- and long-run eﬀects. Section
3 subsequently discusses OPTA’s role in mitigating the market. It is argued
that OPTA may be vulnerable to the Niskanen eﬀect, and will therefore stabi-
lize that Nash equilibrium amongst all the ones it possibly could establish, in
which its role is maximized. The ﬁnal section oﬀers some concluding remarks,
including a possible way out of the OPTA deadlock.
2 A Model of the Dutch Telecom Market
We analyze a simple model that captures an essential part of the Dutch tele-
com market on the ﬁxed network. One competitor, KPN Telecom, controls all
7Cf. Moe (1997).
4
the infrastructure that is needed to provide ﬁxed network telecommunication
services as units of a homogeneous product. By law, KPN Telecom is forced to
supply those units of services to whoever wants to resell it under its own brand
name. For that supply, the dominant ﬁrm can charge a ﬁxed and a variable
interconnection charge. Both these prices have to be approved of by the regu-
lator, that is, by OPTA. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that the
ﬁxed charge that KPN Telecom demands from its resellers is always exactly in
proportion to their amount of sales.
The costs of the regulator are shared among the ﬁrms supplying in that
market. In accordance with the Dutch regulation, a dominant ﬁrm, that is
KPN Telecom, pays 80% of the costs. The other ﬁrms taken as a group pay the
remainder. More formally, in the stylized model of the Dutch telecom market,
the proﬁt functions of KPN Telecom and the fringe ﬁrms, therefore, are as
follows:
ΠKPN = pQ + tq − [c (Q + q) + FCKPN + 0.8FCOPTA −RKPN] , (1)
and
Πfringe = pq − (tq + 0.2FCOPTA + RKPN) , (2)
respectively, where, for reasons of exposition, the fringe ﬁrms are lumped to-
gether in a single representative ﬁrm labelled ‘fringe’. Capital Πi denotes proﬁts
of ﬁrm i, p is the market price for a unit of telecom services, Q is KPN Telecom’s
sales of units, t is the interconnection tariﬀ charged by KPN Telecom for vari-
able capacity to the fringe ﬁrms, q is fringe sales, c reﬂects constant marginal
costs, FCKPN are the ﬁxed costs of production of KPN Telecom, FCOPTA are
the (ﬁxed) costs made by OPTA in policing the market, and RKPN is the ﬁxed
interconnection charge of KPN Telecom.8
Note that all is variable except the split of the costs made by OPTA—
20/80% is laid down in law. Also note that eﬀectively, KPN Telecom deter-
mines, albeit with OPTA watching, the input prices of the newly established
suppliers of telecommunication services. This is interesting, since the fringe
consists of KPN Telecom’s (potential) competitors on the services market. In
the following, we ﬁrst analyze the long run equilibrium in this simple model of
the market.
8This representation of proﬁts captures the main elements of the parties’ costs. See, for
instance, http://www.kpn-wholesale.com/ for similar pricing structures for some of the prod-
ucts KPN Telecom supplies to resellers.
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Before turning to that analysis, let us provide some insight into the money
involved in the Dutch ﬁxed network telecommunication. At the time of writing
this paper, a representative (i.e., national) interconnection tariﬀ t was set at
ranging from Euro 0.0047 to 0.013 and the ﬁxed interconnection charge RKPN
was Euro 85, 992.9 The ﬁxed costs KPN Telecom reported in 2001 (FCKPN)
are Euro 3, 847, 000, 000.10 OPTA’s costs (FCOPTA) were about 0.1% of this,
with a 2001 report of approximately Euro 3, 350, 000.11 Total sales volumes
are hard to come by, but the market share of KPN Telecom in the years 1999,
2000 and 2001 was 78, 66 and 60% respectively, leaving the fringe a slightly
growing, but structurally small share of the market.12 The marginal costs
of KPN Telecom, c, are also hard to obtain. Yet, it seems not unreasonable
to assume they approach zero—as we do. Finally, the telecom market being
known for its use of confusing non-linear pricing strategies, it is diﬃcult to
present simple prices, but the price of a call of one minute within a region KPN
Telecom charged at the time of writing via the ﬁxed connection is Euro 0.0425
in the peak hours and Euro 0.0201 otherwise, upon a start tariﬀ per call of
Euro 0.05, and a monthly fee of Euro 17.18.13
2.1 The Long Run
Given the homogeneous nature of the commodity sold, price competition and
free entry will yield a long-run equilibrium in this market that is characterized
by zero economic proﬁts for all ﬁrms. This zero-proﬁt condition, ΠKPN =
Πfringe = 0, returns the following:
p(Q + q)− c(Q + q)− FCKPN − FCOPTA = 0. (3)
9For the latter ﬁgure, that is the ﬁxed charge plus the charge per access point times the
number of access points in the whole country. All ﬁgures in the remainder of this paragraph
are exclusive of VAT, unless stated otherwise. See http://www.kpn-wholesale.com/ for more
examples.
10See the annual report of KPN Telecom for 2001 (KPN Telecom, 2002). These are the
ﬁxed costs (excluding depreciation and changes in worth) in 2001.
11This ﬁgure is reported in Regeling vergoedingen OPTA 2001 for a ﬁrm oﬀering ﬁxed
network connection and enjoying considerable market power. The actual costs of OPTA are
about three times higher, as it supervises other markets, like the mobile network market, as
well—see OPTA (2001). Likewise, KPN Telecom’s ﬁxed costs are somewhat overstated here,
as other services are oﬀered via the ﬁxed infrastructure such as the provision of internet access,
but are not included here.
12Market share is deﬁned here as the number of minutes KPN Telecom has provided, relative
to the total market it serves via the infrastructure. Cf. KPN Telecom (2002).
13These prices hold for the belbasis subscription, which is arguably the most popular one,
and for nation-wide calls. See http://www.kpn.com/ for prices and additional tariﬀs. The
numbers reported here are VAT-inclusive.
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Now, let α be the market share of the fringe ﬁrms—so that 1−α is the market
share of KPN Telecom. Then we have
ΠKPN = 0 = p(1− α)D(p) + αtD(p)− cD(p)
−(1− α)(FCKPN + 0.8FCOPTA),
which can be rewritten to:
((1 − α)p + αt− c)D(p) = (1− α)(FCKPN + 0.8FCOPTA),
which in turn solves as
t =
(
p− FCKPN + 0.8FCOPTA
D(p)
)(
1− 1
α
)
+
c
α
. (4)
This critical value of the interconnection fee t is the variable tariﬀ OPTA
can set to ensures that proﬁts are indeed equal to zero and market shares remain
stable.14 Thus, besides depending on the market share of the fringe ﬁrms, α, t is
a function of general market conditions p and D(p), and of all cost components,
FCKPN, FCfringe, and c.
The expression for the long-run interconnection tariﬀ has at least two char-
acteristics that are worth noting. First, since the second term in brackets is
negative for α ≤ 1, t < c, which means that KPN Telecom is losing money
on every unit it sells to one of its competitors. This is not inconsistent with
the rough data presented above. Second, dtdα > 0, which indicates that as the
market share of the fringe ﬁrms (KPN Telecom) increases, the proﬁt margin de-
creases (increases). As a result, any equilibrium in the market can be sustained
by OPTA, by changing t.
To illustrate the latter point, consider the eﬀects of an increase in market
share by a party on either side of the market. If KPN Telecom increases its
market share at the expense of the new entrants, it increases its proﬁts, as it
substitutes away from losing money on selling to competitors (since t < c).
OPTA, however, eﬀectively responds to this by decreasing t, α has to decrease
when 1 − α increases, and dtdα > 0. This increases demand by the other ﬁrms,
as their proﬁt margins increase. Therefore, any attempt by KPN Telecom to
grow will meet strong resistance by the other ﬁrms. Something similar occurs
if the fringe ﬁrms attempt to increase their market shares—it does increase
14Note that in this it is assumed that KPN Telecom charges a share α of all of its ﬁxed costs
to the fringe ﬁrms. These ﬁxed costs include the ‘fee’ it has to pay OPTA. This assumption
does not aﬀect the qualititative ﬁndings,however.
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their proﬁts, but since OPTA responds by increasing t, KPN Telecom would be
reluctant to give up market share and increase sales via the fringe, which is a
loss making activity. Hence, increasing market share is virtually impossible for
the fringe.
A more formal analysis veriﬁes these eﬀects. Diﬀerentiating equations (1–2)
with respect to α, whilst taking into account the (optimal) response by OPTA,
equation (4) yields zero’s. In other words, in the long run, and in the presence
of OPTA, whose policy is characterized by equation (4), all attempts by any of
the suppliers to increase proﬁts by increasing market share are futile.
2.2 The Short Run
From the preceding analysis it follows that, if OPTA responds optimally (that is
according to equation (4)), the market is more or less static in the long run. The
informational requirements on OPTA to react in this way, however, are rather
strict. It is not unreasonable to foresee that, in the short run, an external shock
is not accommodated in full, or is not responded to immediately. After all, to
do so requires quite some insight into the characteristics and development of
the market that even OPTA cannot be expected to obtain instantaneously. If
we allow for this, deviations from the long run equilibrium are possible.
In the short run, that is for a given, not necessarily optimal, t¯, the intentions
of both KPN Telecom and the fringe can be studied by diﬀerentiating their
proﬁts at the status quo. This returns the following.15
dΠKPN
dα
= −(p− t¯)D(p) + FCKPN + 0.8FCOPTA < 0, and (5)
dΠfringe
dα
= (p− t¯)D(p)− FCKPN − 0.8FCOPTA > 0, (6)
so that both ﬁrms have an incentive to increase their market share, as that
increases their proﬁts.
To illustrate the short run developments in the market on which this result
may shed some light, let us go back to the situation at the time OPTA was
established, with KPN Telecom being the sole supplier, and no competitive
fringe present. OPTA at the time sought to set t in such a way that it enabled
new ﬁrms to enter the market. There is reason to believe OPTA set t very
low at time, acting aggressively towards accommodating entry. As a result, the
15The inequalities hold if (p − t)D(p) > FCKPN + 0.8FC∗OPTA, which is the case as c > t,
and proﬁts are nonnegative.
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proﬁt margins of the entering ﬁrms were relatively high and those ﬁrms very
much would have wanted to enter and increase their sales rapidly. After all,
upon entry they have payed for part the ﬁxed OPTA costs involved, and the
marginal costs plus the part in the ﬁxed network costs together are below the
market price.
However, KPN Telecom cannot allow the fringe to expand, as that would
impose a loss to the company, since anything it sells to the fringe, it eﬀectively
sells below market price—even if KPN Telecom would increase production—
since t  c < p. Therefore, KPN Telecom can credibly claim that it cannot
oﬀer more capacity to the fringe. Therefore, an equilibrium is established at
a value of α that solves equation (4) for that speciﬁc interconnection tariﬀ t.
That is, with little entry, a small market share for the fringe, and maintained
dominance of KPN Telecom, as dαdt > 0. If, on the other hand, it were the
case that OPTA has set t too high, the proﬁt margin of the fringe would have
been low to nil, and entering ﬁrms would either not have resold anything, or
they would have had to sell a very high quantity at once, for being active in
the market to be proﬁtable. As KPN Telecom would have been very hesitant
to supply services—let alone services of suﬃcient quantity, another dimension
along which KPN Telecom displayed resistance to the fringe entry, here ignored
as we consider a homogenous commodity—again only KPN Telecom would have
served the market. In any event, therefore, OPTA’s objective to invite entry
into the telecommunications market are diﬃcult for the regulator to meet.
2.3 An Illustrative Example
To illustrate the various short- and long-run eﬀects identiﬁed above, consider
the following simple numerical example of the forces at work. We do not claim
any particular relevance for the numbers used below. The sole intent is to
provide some insights into how OPTA can steer equilibria in the market via t,
and what eﬀects can be expected from deviations from the equilibrium levels.
Assume that there is a linear demand function D(p) = a − bp for a homo-
geneous good, and that marginal cost, c = 1, a = 500, 000, b = 1, FCKPN =
1.000, 000, and FCOPTA = 50, 000. This generates p  3.10, and D(p) 
499, 997. Table 1 lists the various combinations of t and α that satisfy the
equilibrium conditions (Πi = 0) for these numbers.
It can be observed that a higher t—counterintuitively, as t is their input
price—leads to a higher market share of the fringe ﬁrms. This occurs because
9
t!]
Table 1: α and t in an illustrative example
t α
0.820 0.10
0.920 0.20
0.953 0.30
0.970 0.40
0.980 0.50
0.987 0.60
0.991 0.70
0.993 0.75
the lower proﬁt margin, p − t, forces the fringe ﬁrms to sell more in order to
maintain maximum (zero) proﬁts. This eﬀect is illustrated in Figure 1.
The two market shares for KPN and the fringe, respectively, are determined
by the intersection of the two net average costs curves, and the market price,
which is determined by the costs of KPN and the fringe together, so that prof-
its are zero. A higher t shifts the net average cost curve of the fringe ﬁrms,
ACfringe(t), upwards. As the loss margin of KPN Telecom decreases (t < c), the
average cost curve of KPN Telecom, ACKPN(t), will shift down in proportion
.........................................................




p, AC
D(p)
ACKPN(t)ACfringe(t)
t↑
t↓
t↓
t↑
0
p
︸ ︷︷ ︸
αD(p)
Figure 1: A Prototypical Telecommunication Market
10
to this, as the market equilibrium price p is independent of t. Consequently, by
pinning down t, OPTA chooses the distribution of the market.
3 OPTA’s Deadlock
Next, consider OPTA’s mitigation task. As said, the explicit task of OPTA
is to steer the ﬁxed network telecom market to one in which KPN Telecom’s
historic monopoly is broken and replaced by balanced competition. This OPTA
can achieve by setting t so as to support a symmetric oligopolistic market.
Eﬀectively, that means forcing KPN Telecom to sell network access to other
ﬁrms, which the latter is hesitant to do, certainly in the short-run, with ﬁxed
interconnection tariﬀs, but probably even in the long-run, when its proﬁts are
being compensated via adjustment of t.
So in its eﬀorts to comply with its stated objectives, OPTA faces at least
one reluctant party. To that should be added that, as explained in the intro-
duction, OPTA is a bureaucracy open to the Niskanen eﬀect. Its future funding
depends on two main factors: its present costs, which is the larger and ﬁxed
part, and the variable income it receives from the mitigating tasks it fulﬁls.
Not only is it therefore in the interest of OPTA to maintain a market struc-
ture in which some party at least does not decrease in market size below the
25% threshold set for “considerable market power,” so that it falls under the
high tariﬀ structure. It is crucial for OPTA’s proliferation that KPN Telecom
maintains a suﬃciently asymmetric market share. That is, since it is explicit
that OPTA’s role as mitigator of the market would be trimmed substantially
once the competitive balance displays a reasonable number of suppliers with
more or less equal market shares, it has an interest in preventing this from
happening. By maintaining the high market share of KPN Telecom, OPTA can
keep its high budget. Moreover, in that way OPTA can substantiate that it
may require higher budgets to perform its tasks properly. After all, it has to
continue ﬁghting the KPN Telecom monopoly.
The setup of the regulatory arrangements does not help OPTA to resist
the perverse pressures it faces, to say the least. Consider the following: when
the interconnection tariﬀ t is not in equilibrium, and since it is smaller than c,
KPN Telecom refuses to give away market share in the short run. The fringe
ﬁrms, however, want to increase their market share, either because t is below
its equilibrium value given in equation (4) above and the fringe can increase
11
proﬁts by obtaining a larger market share, or because t is above its equilibrium
value, and then the fringe needs a higher market share in order to maintain
zero proﬁts given the ﬁxed costs it faces. This reluctance of KPN Telecom is
typically what is observed in the newspapers.16 Oﬃcially, OPTA would need
to mitigate in this, and force KPN Telecom to part from its market share.
Yet, it runs counter its silent objective to maintain an asymmetric market
structure. Therefore, OPTA would be tempted in the long run to adjust the
interconnection tariﬀ so as to accommodate for KPN Telecom’s problems with
increasing its loss-generating sales via the fringe. By thus moving t in the
direction of its equilibrium value, the fringe ﬁrms loose their interest in a larger
share of total sales, and OPTA eﬀectively stabilizes the status quo.
A second detrimental eﬀect of OPTA’s deadlock position is that it is also
not encouraged to keep its costs in check. That is, it can enlarge its bureau-
cratic costs in FCOPTA, as it can restore market equilibrium by changing its
instrumental variable, the interconnection tariﬀ.17 From equation (4) it follows
directly that an increase in the costs of OPTA are in equilibrium matched by
an increase in t. In the short run, with t ﬁxed, however, the eﬀects of increased
OPTA costs are comparable to the pressures on OPTA from disequilibrium in-
terconnection tariﬀs discussed above. That is, since total diﬀerentiation of the
zero proﬁt conditions of both KPN Telecom and the fringe gives the following
signs for the eﬀect of TCOPTA on the desired market share:
dα
dTCOPTA
∣∣∣∣
ΠKPN=0
= −∂ΠKPN/∂TCOPTA
∂ΠKPN/∂α
=
0.8(1 − α)
(t− p)D(p) + TCKPN + 0.8TCOPTA < 0, (7)
and
dα
dTCOPTA
∣∣∣∣
Πfringe=0
= −∂Πfringe/∂TCOPTA
∂Πfringe/∂α
=
0.8α + 0.2
(p− t)D(p)− TCKPN − 0.8TCOPTA > 0. (8)
These expressions indicate that both KPN Telecom and the fringe ﬁrms want
to increase their market share, giving rise to a conﬂict in which KPN Telecom’s
having to OK sales via the fringe leads to the blocking problem discussed above.
Although this runs counter to the general objective to lower the interconnection
16Cf. Het Parool, 2003, for a recent example.
17Note, for example, that there has been a 23% costs increase from 2000 to 2001 – Regeling
vergoedingen OPTA 2001.
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tariﬀ in order to accommodate entry into telecommunication market, the way
in which OPTA tasks have been handed down to the institution put it in a
diﬃcult position to carry them out as intended.
The sketch of the market provided in Figure 1 above illustrates the eﬀect
of an increase in the costs of OPTA. From equation (3), it is clear that when
FCOPTA increases, market demand decreases and the market price increases,
albeit only slightly in the example here. That is, the dotted price line in Figure 1
shifts upwards. The eﬀect of this on the respective market shares is ambiguous,
as a closer inspection of equation (4) reveals. An increase in FCOPTA increases
t, but at the same time p increases, which in turn decreases t. Again, OPTA
can install any distribution of the market it sees ﬁt.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have identiﬁed two channels through which OPTA may be tempted to
deviate from its set goal to open the ﬁxed telecommunications network up
for new entrants into the market, both leading to its accommodation of KPN
Telecom’s reluctance to sell part of demand via the fringe ﬁrms while allowing
OPTA to give in to a Niskanen eﬀect. If indeed these processes are at work in
the Dutch telecommunications market—and there is some anecdotal evidence
at least that they might very well be—a question of interest is how to set up
natural monopoly control without these detriments.
A ﬁrst—and to the situation of OPTA quite speciﬁc—feature that stands
out in the setup chosen to regulate the Dutch telecommunication market on
the ﬁxed network is the way in which OPTA is ﬁnanced. As it draws the larger
part of its budget directly from the parties it is to control, in which in turn the
telecom ﬁrms with the larger (dominant) market share pay a disproportionately
large fee in the two-part tariﬀ structure, there is a direct tie between OPTA’s
regulatory eﬀorts and its income. We have pointed out how particularly this
potentially interferes with OPTA’s objective to establish symmetric competition
on the net. Should OPTA be ﬁnanced out of general funds, it would be able to
carry out its tasks with a greater degree of independence from the industry.
A more fundamental change to the setup that is likely to enhance the en-
forcement of average cost pricing by a regulator, which does not fall victim to
the perverse incentive eﬀects that OPTA faces, would be a strict separation of
ownership of the infrastructure from the use of it. This setup has, for example,
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been chosen for the railway tracks in the United Kingdom as well as in The
Netherlands—where the infrastructure is either a government subsidiary or a
regulated private monopoly. The company responsible for the infrastructure
then is eﬀectively given control over the natural monopoly, so that it should be
controlled strictly. But when the use of the infrastructure is in separate hands,
there theoretically no longer is a preferred user—like KPN Telecom is to itself
at the moment. The infrastructure ﬁrm, in fact, would have a preference for
competition for its services, thus inviting entry into the market for use of the
infrastructure.
This separation of ownership and use, however, also has an important down-
side. With ownership and use integrated, there is a clear incentive for the owners
of the infrastructure to invest in the maintenance of the network. Additionally,
it has superior information on how to do so eﬃciently. A stand-alone infras-
tructure owner, on the contrary, lacks the incentive to choose an eﬃcient level
of maintenance. Therefore, the government control of the infrastructure ﬁrm
is essential, yet likely to be oﬀ the mark as well—see Wagner (1991). There
are several ways in which these information and incentive problems of a pure
mitigator, with no ties to the industry, can be accommodated for. One could,
for example, opt to elect and re-elect a regulator on a regular basis—see Besley
and Coate (2000). That way, it is forced to regularly give account of its ac-
tivities, which the public can check against its private information. Another
option is to establish yardstick competition of the kind advocated by Shleifer
(1985), in which diﬀerent regulators are compared, for example, internationally.
Another an option would be to preset goals for the completion of which various
institutions subsequently compete. All of these ways of organizing regulation
of the market would enhance the dissemination of information and stimulate
OPTA to regulate towards eﬃcient use of the ﬁxed telecommunication network.
We have shown how in its present setting OPTA will live long. Since a
natural monopoly requires some sort of regulatory control, this in itself is not
necessarily a problem. The problem in the present regulatory construction, how-
ever, is that with a long lived OPTA, an asymmetrically competing market, in
which OPTA is open to the Niskanen eﬀect, remains. A clean break between
infrastructure, use of the infrastructure, and control on the price setting by the
infrastructure operator would enable an unobstructed view of the processes at
play. Moreover, it would accommodate a structural shift to symmetric com-
petition on telecommunication services. Such an organization of the natural
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monopoly would also call for a role for OPTA. Rather that the current uneasy
position, as a temporary addition to the Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit,
however, OPTA would then be an integral part of NMa, guarding the isolated
problem of the pricing of network services at average costs. Long live OPTA,
that is, but meaner and leaner than it is today.
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